


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

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

25 October 1960

## DAILY BRIEF

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-UN: The Soviet bloc delegations plan to stage an early walkout from the disarmament discussions in the UN Political Committee following the presentations of the neutrals and possibly Britain, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The Soviet Union may feel this will create pressure on the West to accept Moscow's concept of universal disarmament as the basis for negotiations, and provide justification for demanding a special General Assembly session on disarmament early next spring. Bloc propaganda accompanying such a walkout would probably echo the earlier claim, made after the bloc withdrawal from the ten-nation disarmament conference in Geneva last June, that the USSR refuses to abuse world hopes for disarmament by engaging in fruitless discussions with those who seek only "control without disarmament."

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Arab League Oil Congress: The Second Arab League Oil Congress, held in Beirut from 17 to 22 October, provided further signs that Western-owned oil companies operating in the Middle East will be subject to increasing pressures from local governments. Congress resolutions supported the demands of Arab governments for amending the concession agreements as well as their refusal to recognize oil-price reductions instituted by the oil companies without Arab approval. A Soviet observer at the Congress told the Arabs they have "no cause to fear" competition from Soviet oil exports to Western markets; he accused the major Western-owned petroleum companies of maintaining a "monopoly market" and extracting "fabulous" profits from their operations in Arab countries. [REDACTED]

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Burma - China: Burma has agreed to provide Communist China 300,000 to 400,000 long tons of rice during 1961 in exchange for Chinese commodities. This arrangement, announced in a joint communiqué in Rangoon on 24 October, follows the signing of the Sino-Burmese border treaty in Peiping on 1 October. Trade between the two countries fell off following the termination in 1957 of the three year barter agreement signed in 1954, although Rangoon's imports from China have caused a sizable Burmese trade deficit. [redacted]

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[redacted] (Page 2)

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### III. THE WEST

Cuba: The Castro regime apparently is recalling Cuban diplomatic and consular officers abroad for purposes of screening them and preparing for a new concerted propaganda offensive against the United States. Departures of Cuban personnel for Havana have already been noted or reported scheduled in Brazil, Mexico, and Panama. [redacted] (Page 5)

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DAILY BRIEF

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The Second Arab League Oil Congress

The proceedings of the Second Arab League Oil Congress, held from 17 to 22 October in Beirut, provided further signs that the Western oil companies operating in the Middle East will be subject to gradually increasing pressure from the local governments. The Congress, however, achieved nothing as significant as the creation in Baghdad a month earlier of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, whose charter members are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, and Venezuela.

This year's Congress, like the one held in April 1959, operated in many respects like a debating society. It was attended by officials of the leading oil companies, by government representatives of all oil-producing Arab states, and by a number of government observers from oil-producing states outside the area.

The Arab government representatives devoted most of their efforts to detailed presentation of proposals aimed at getting more money for their oil. The Congress' resolutions supported two of the less drastic of these proposals: efforts by Arab governments to amend their concession agreements and refusal of the government to recognize oil-price reductions instituted by the oil companies without Arab approval.

Oil company pricing policies have been under strong Arab attack since the August cut in posted prices for Middle East oil. Company spokesmen have defended their action on the ground that the oil market had become more competitive and that increased Soviet exports were a key factor; they re-emphasized this point at the Congress. The leader of the Soviet observer delegation to the Congress attempted to rebut this point of view. He told the Arabs they have "no cause to fear" competition from Soviet oil exports to Western markets; at the same time, he accused the major Western-owned petroleum companies of maintaining a "monopoly market" and extracting "fabulous" profits from their operations in Arab countries.

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Burma to Provide Large Quantity of Rice  
To Communist China

Burma has agreed to provide Communist China from 300,000 to 400,000 long tons of rice during 1961, according to a joint communiqué issued in Rangoon on 24 October. China will pay for this in unspecified "commodities that Burma requires and China may be able to supply, so as to balance trade between the two countries."

This arrangement, which will take between 15 and 20 percent of Burma's exportable rice surplus, is the first major follow-up to the signing of the Sino-Burmese border treaty on 1 October 1960 and is the most significant development in Sino-Burmese trade since termination of the 1954 barter agreement in April 1957. Since February 1958, trade between the two countries has been held to a minimum, conducted on a cash basis with commodities paid for in sterling.

There has been a steady demand for Chinese products, especially consumer goods, in Burma, and the government has been seeking means to increase its sales to Communist China.

Under the 1954-57 barter trade agreement Burma consistently imported more from Communist China than it was able to export, and the deficit continues although the government has maintained strict regulation over import licenses since that time.

Peiping's difficulties in meeting its rice export commitments suggest that at least some of the high-quality rice purchased from Burma in 1961 will be re-exported under Chinese trade agreements with Cuba, Ceylon, or bloc countries. [REDACTED]

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Cuban Officials Abroad Apparently Being Recalled  
for Harassing and Intimidation

The Castro regime apparently is recalling diplomatic and consular officers to serve them and to prepare for a new concerted propaganda offensive against the United States. Three members of the Cuban Embassy in Brazil are scheduled to leave for Havana this week. [redacted]

[redacted] they would remain in Cuba for eight to ten days. The Cuban ambassador in Mexico [redacted]

[redacted] scheduled to return [redacted] to Cuba for "consultations" this month. The Cuban ambassador in Panama left for home on 20 October, but his recall may have been at the request of the Panamanian Government, which has been irritated at his interference in domestic Panamanian affairs. Other Cuban officials abroad, including some in Europe, Asia, and Africa, will probably be recalled for consultation in the coming weeks.

The Castro regime has been embarrassed by a number of defections this year among Cuban officials abroad. Its efforts to prevent further defections were presaged in a 27 September decree removing job tenure rights from foreign service personnel. It is becoming apparent that those officials regarded as "reliable" by the regime for foreign assignment are those who unquestioningly accept and are willing to promote the Communist position on Cuban and international issues. The new Cuban ambassador to France, appointed on 20 October, for instance, has a long record of Communist associations and has frequently been described as a convinced practicing Communist. [redacted]

[redacted]

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**The Vice President**

**Executive Offices of the White House**

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

**The Treasury Department**

The Secretary of the Treasury

**The Department of State**

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

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The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

**The Department of Commerce**

The Secretary of Commerce

**Federal Bureau of Investigation**

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